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Abstract 
 
China’s development model faces an external constraint that could cause an 
economic hard landing. China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse, and its 
size now renders its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the U.S. 
market, but the scale of its exports is contributing to the massive U.S. trade deficit, 
creating financial fragility and undermining the U.S. manufacturing sector. These 
developments could stall the U.S. economy’s expansion, in turn triggering a global 
recession that will embrace China. This is the external constraint. 
 These considerations suggest China should transition from export-led growth to 
domestic demand-led growth. This requires growing the economy’s demand side as well 
as its supply-side. To avoid stalling the U.S. economic expansion, which is critical to 
China’s growth, China should significantly revalue its currency as part of a generalized 
East Asian upward currency revaluation. 
Longer term, China should raise wages and improve income distribution. Under 
export-led growth, higher wages undermine employment. Under domestic demand-led 
growth, they support it. The challenge is to raise wages in an efficient decentralized 
manner. History shows that this requires independent democratic trade unions. However, 
such unions are currently unacceptable to Chinese political leadership. Creating a 
domestic demand-led growth regime therefore requires solving this political roadblock. 
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 I Limits to China’s current development strategy: competing hypotheses 
 Over the last twenty years China has experienced an economic development 
miracle. Its recent success is captured in table 1 which details key economic statistics 
including the GDP growth rate, level of foreign direct investment (FDI), level of total 
exports, rate of growth of exports, exports to the U.S., trade surplus with the U.S., global 
trade surplus, and level of foreign exchange reserve holdings. Over the last five years, 
both real GDP and exports have grown rapidly, and especially impressive has been 
China’s continued growth during the global downturn of 2001.  
 A debate has now opened regarding the sustainability of the Chinese model. 
Ironically, this debate has been triggered by the recent acceleration in Chinese growth, 
which exceeded 9 percent in 2003 and 2004. The fear is that rapid growth is being driven 
by a private investment bubble and excessive misdirected state investment. As a result, 
China risks rising inflation, and when the bubble pops there could be a damaging hard 
landing. 
 This paper offers an alternative interpretation of China’s development model. 
Like the conventional story described above, it too argues that the current model is 
unsustainable. However, it is not the “domestic” consequences of over-investment and 
excessive growth that are the reasons. Instead, the reason is China’s “external” impact on 
the global economy, which threatens to trigger a world recession that will rebound and 
embrace China.  
 In effect, there are two competing hypotheses regarding China’s development 
model. The conventional hypothesis is labeled the “internal contradictions” story, and it 
emphasizes the domestic financial instability and inflationary consequences of over-
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investment and fixed exchange rates. In Washington D.C. it is associated with the views 
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and economists Morris Goldstein 
and Nicholas Lardy of the Institute for International Economics.1 The alternative 
hypothesis is labeled the “external contradictions” story. It is rooted in global 
Keynesianism and emphasizes the deflationary consequences of China’s export-led 
development model. Both hypotheses maintain that China risks a hard economic landing 
absent policy changes, but they differ regarding the trigger behind the hard landing.2 
 It is easy to conflate these two interpretations as they have important 
complementarities. Thus, under the external contradictions story, an export slowdown is 
likely to trigger domestic financial instability as borrowers default on loans and Chinese 
economic activity contracts. Likewise, the internal contradictions story can have over-
investment concentrated in the export sector. However, the two hypotheses rest on 
distinct trigger mechanisms.3  
 The balance of the paper is as follows. Section II provides an interpretation of the 
current Chinese development model.  Section III describes the internal contradictions 
hypothesis and proposed policy remedies. Section IV describes the external 
contradictions hypothesis. Section V describes the proposed policy remedies for the 
external contradiction problem. The core challenge is to build China’s domestic market, 
which means addressing China’s wage and income distribution problem. This leads into 
controversial territory since the economic institutions (e,g free democratic trade unions) 
needed to solve the income distribution problem have political implications that are 
unacceptable to China’s current political leadership. Section VI concludes the paper.  
 II Interpreting the current Chinese development model 
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 China’s recent economic record has been one of phenomenal success. Broadly 
speaking, the Chinese development model aims to reduce the size of the centralized 
planned economy and increase the size market-based private sector activity. The first step 
in this transition was taken with the historic 1979 reforms of the agricultural sector. Since 
then, private sector activity has been allowed to spread more widely by removal of 
controls on economic activity, and it is also being spread (in limited fashion) by partial 
privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs). This spread of market-centered activity 
has been accompanied by an explicit external and internal capital accumulation strategy. 
The external accumulation strategy rests on foreign direct investment (FDI) and export-
led growth, while the internal strategy rests on use of state-controlled domestic bank 
credit creation to fund SOEs and infrastructure investment. This development strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
FDI has served to bring capital goods and high technology into the country, and 
has been financed by foreign multinational companies (MNCs). The scale of FDI flows is 
reflected in the fact that China was the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 2002, and the 
total stock of FDI in China exceeded $500 billion by the end of 2003.4 China is currently 
the third largest cumulative recipient of FDI, and at current rates of inflow it will soon be 
the second largest.  
In addition to bringing in capital goods and high technology, the construction and 
operation of foreign-owned plants has also created employment. Particularly important is 
the fact that FDI has been a form of self-financing development that solves the historic 
foreign exchange shortage problem. Industrialization calls for importing capital goods 
from developed economies. Historically, this has imposed a balance of payments 
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constraint on growth, and has also led to the accumulation of foreign currency 
denominated debts. This in turn has exposed countries to financial fragility as the real 
value of debts can change rapidly due to exchange rate fluctuations. China’s FDI-based 
development model short-circuits this foreign financing problem. 
In addition to funding industrialization, FDI has also provided a source of export 
earnings since a significant portion of MNC output in China is exported. In 2004, MNCs 
provided 57 percent of total exports, and these exports earnings have provided foreign 
exchange and balance of payments cover that has ensured external investor confidence.5 
This export production has been a core element of China’s export-led growth strategy. In 
the absence of a developed domestic consumer market, China has relied on foreign 
markets – especially the U.S. market – to provide demand for the goods produced by 
Chinese factories. At the official exchange rate exports constituted approximately 27.5% 
of China’s GDP in 2003. According to the World Bank, manufacturing represents 
approximately 44.5% of China’s GDP. Assuming all exports are manufactured and 
imported inputs represent one-third of the value of exports, this implies exports equal 
41% of China’s manufacturing output. 
FDI has also provided advanced technology and capital to China, which combined 
with China’s low wage labor, has made China the low cost global manufacturing leader. 
With exports booming, foreign MNCs have been willing to continue building new plants 
in China. On the surface, this has given rise to the anomalous situation in which low 
income China has been a lender (in the form of its trade surplus) to the high income 
United States. Normally, it is expected that high-income households save and lend to 
low-income households. However, there is logic to this situation. Exports and a trade 
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surplus (i.e. Chinese savings) are the price that China pays for getting foreign MNCs to 
invest in China. For the Chinese government this is a deal worth striking, since China 
gains productive capacity, high technology, and jobs. The foreign exchange from the 
trade surplus also provides protection against the vagaries of the international economy.6 
The bottom line is that though FDI is small relative to total Chinese fixed asset 
accumulation, it occupies a special position of leverage in the Chinese development 
model.7 Much Chinese fixed asset accumulation is public infrastructure capital that yields 
social returns. FDI yields market returns, transfers technological know-how, and 
generates export earnings. Moreover, this is done without recourse to foreign borrowing.   
The above external accumulation strategy has been complemented by an internal 
strategy predicated on state-directed domestic bank credit expansion, which finances 
domestic expenditures in SOEs. The state owned domestic banking system has been used 
to fund large industrial and infrastructure investment projects, as well as to maintain 
employment in loss-making SOEs. This has helped support domestic aggregate demand 
(AD) and also avoided a precipitous collapse of employment in the SOE sector.  
The fact that the state owns the banking system means that the state has been able 
to direct funds in these ways. Lack of alternative financial institutions and investments 
means that Chinese savers have effectively been forced to finance these state investment 
activities since savers have few alternatives in which to place their money. Finally, the 
interest cost of this internal accumulation strategy has been kept down via financial 
repression – that is keeping interest rates low by policy edict. 
III The internal contradictions hypothesis 
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The above development model has worked remarkably well. However, recently 
doubts have been expressed about the long run viability of the model. In particular, there 
are fears that China’s rapid growth rate is unsustainable, and is being driven by an asset 
price bubble and excessive state investment financed with domestic credit creation. In 
addition, China’s large current account (trade) and capital account (FDI) surpluses 
combined with its fixed exchange rate, have led to increased money supply growth (see 
table 1). This is because China’s central bank has had to provide liquidity in order to 
prevent the exchange rate from appreciating. As a result, monetary policy has been highly 
accommodative of the investment boom. The danger is that this will generate even more 
investment, further asset price increases and accelerating inflation, all of which will 
eventually end in a hard landing.8  
This view can be labeled the internal contradictions hypothesis, and it sees 
China’s existing development strategy as running into trouble because of problems 
internal to the Chinese economy. This internal contradictions hypothesis can be 
understood with the help of Figure 2. The internal contradictions view focuses on 
problems in the banking system and corruption, and it also focuses on the domestic 
inflation consequences of an undervalued real exchange rate.9  
With regard to the banking system, the internal contradictions view focuses on 
problems associated with state direction of bank lending and reliance on non-market 
lending criteria.  First, such lending is frequently associated with corruption owing to 
lack of commercial checks. Second, the absence of commercial lending criteria results in 
misallocation of resources, with over-building in some sectors and under-building in 
others. When resources are allocated on market principles, they are directed to sectors 
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where there are shortages and returns are highest. When cronyism dominates the 
allocation process, there can be under-building in sectors with shortages and bottlenecks, 
and continued over-building in sectors with excess capacity. At the macroeconomic level, 
this means the Chinese economy may be simultaneously prone to both inflation and 
deflation – inflation in sectors with bottlenecks and deflation in sectors with excess 
capacity. Third, the non-commercial credit allocation means that China’s banking system 
is insolvent and full of non-performing loans (NPLs). Many of the “so-called” 
investments financed by bank loans are unproductive, and many loans have simply 
financed SOE operating expenditures. 
The internal contradictions view also identifies inflation, caused by an 
undervalued fixed exchange rate, as a problem. This is classic open economy 
monetarism.10 Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate requires the monetary authority 
to sell local currency, which expands the domestic money supply leading to domestic 
inflation and economic distortions that go with higher inflation.11 
China’s policymakers have accepted some of this argument, and have initiated 
policies aimed at slowing growth and reducing inflationary pressures. Thus, state and 
local governments have been instructed to cut back on infrastructure investments, banks 
have been ordered to curtail the expansion of lending, reserve requirements have been 
raised to drain liquidity from the banking system, and open market sterilization 
operations have also been used to reduce liquidity.12  In October 2004 the official interest 
rate was also raised a quarter point. Steps are also being taken to partially privatize the 
banking system by selling off minority stakes. This will raise foreign exchange for the 
Chinese government, and it is hoped that the introduction of foreign owners will result in 
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the adoption of new management practices that put banks on a commercially oriented 
footing. However, no action has been taken regarding the under-valued exchange rate. 
Proponents of the internal contradictions view maintain that these partial reforms 
are not enough and that more fundamental reforms are needed to avoid a hard landing.13 
Administrative lending controls are unlikely to be adequate as companies can turn to 
other unregulated sources of funding, and the central government also has difficulties 
controlling state government investment spending. Partial privatization of the banking 
system may also be insufficient to root out existing management and end politically 
directed bank lending. Finally, failure to revalue the exchange rate means that there will 
be continued inflationary pressure from increases in the money supply induced by the 
trade surplus and capital inflows.14 
Fundamental contradictions or costly frictions? 
There is substance to the internal contradictions hypothesis. However, the key 
question is whether these problems constitute a “fundamental contradiction” within the 
Chinese development model or whether they are just “costly frictions.”  This paper 
maintains that they are costly frictions rather than fundamental contradictions. That is 
they impose large costs on the Chinese economy, and China would be better off if they 
were remedied. However, failure to do so will not force a hard landing.  
The current misallocation of credit results in sub-optimal use of resources. 
However, as long as China maintains its existing capital controls, the system can 
continue. This is because Chinese depositors have nowhere else to place their money, and 
this closed nature of the domestic financial system protects against bank runs. As long as 
the system remains closed, the NPL problem can be dealt with by periodic bank re-
 10
capitalizations financed by the central bank – which is similar to the way the U.S. dealt 
with its saving and loan crisis through the Resolution Trust Corporation.  
As currently configured, the financial system is stable even though it is 
inefficient. It only risks becoming unstable when capital controls are removed or when it 
is opened up to foreign competition. If capital controls are removed, Chinese depositors 
will be able to shift money outside the system. Given their existing limited international 
portfolio diversification, future political uncertainties regarding property rights in China, 
and the questionable status of China’s banking system, depositors would almost certainly 
rush for the exits and precipitate a financial crisis. Similarly, if foreign commercial banks 
are allowed to operate independently in China, there will likely be a move out of Chinese 
banks into foreign owned banks, and this would also quickly expose the failings of 
domestic banks. These considerations suggest China should avoid opening its capital 
account, and they also suggest China will be reluctant to meet its WTO commitment to 
allow foreign financial competition.15 
Regarding the undervalued exchange rate and current account surplus, the internal 
contradictions view emphasizes the accelerating inflation danger of maintaining an 
undervalued fixed exchange rate. Such analysis represents a form of monetarist thinking. 
An inflation danger does exist, but the link between money supply expansion and 
inflation is subject to long and uncertain lags. Moreover, inflation can be suppressed 
through such measures as increased bank reserve requirements or sterilized open market 
operations in which the central bank sells bonds and drains excess money from the 
financial system. If inflation were the only problem associated with an under-valued 
exchange rate, it would be an irritation but not a fundamental systemic contradiction.  
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IV The external contradictions hypothesis: limits to export-led growth 
The previous section argued that the internal contradictions hypothesis does not 
stand up to scrutiny. While there are major internal inefficiencies in the current Chinese 
development model, these inefficiencies are costly frictions rather than contradictions. If 
nothing is done about them, Chinese economic welfare will be lower but they will not 
pull down the system. Indeed, if modestly faster inflation were the only cost to an 
undervalued exchange rate, then Chinese policymakers would be well advised to stick 
with an undervalued exchange rate because of the other benefits under-valuation yields. 
This leads to the external contradictions story.  In terms of Figure 2, the focus is 
the far right bottom box. The argument is that China’s existing strategy is fundamentally 
flawed owing to its reliance on export-led growth powered, principally, by the U.S. 
market.16 The reason for this contradiction is that China has become such a global 
manufacturing powerhouse that it is now driving the massive U.S. trade deficit and 
undermining the U.S. manufacturing sector, in turn threatening the viability of its major 
customer. In addition, China is also putting pressure on the European Union’s 
manufacturing sector, slowing economic growth in that region. 
Table 2 provides data on China’s impact on the U.S. trade deficit. Excluding the 
deficit with OPEC countries, which is driven by special oil price factors, the overall U.S. 
goods trade deficit was $579.3 billion in 2004. Excluding OPEC and China, the overall 
deficit was $417.3 billion. The bilateral deficit with China was $162.0 billion, 
representing 38.8% of the U.S. deficit with all non-OPEC countries. In 2004 the deficit 
excluding OPEC and China increased by $60.1 billion; the bilateral China deficit 
increased by $37.9 billion, equal to 63.1% of the increase in the non-OPEC non-China 
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deficit. In growth terms, the bilateral China deficit grew 30.5 percent, while the non-
OPEC non-China deficit grew 16.8 percent. Moreover, these developments continue a 
trend that has seen China’s share of the U.S. trade deficit steadily rise since 1999. 
The trade deficit threatens to become a source of financial instability. More 
importantly, the deficit is contributing to the problems in manufacturing that are 
hindering a robust investment-led recovery.  There are two ways in which the deficit has 
hindered recovery. First, the deficit drains spending out of the U.S. economy so that jobs 
are lost or are created offshore instead of at home. Using an input-output methodology 
that estimates the labor content embodied in the deficit, Scott estimates that the U.S. trade 
deficit with China in 2003 embodied 1,339,300 lost job opportunities.17 Using Scott’s job 
calculations and assuming the composition of trade remained unchanged in 2004, the 
2004 trade deficit with China of $162 billion represents 1,808,055 lost job 
opportunities.18 Second, China adversely impacts investment spending through a range of 
channels. The draining of demand via the trade deficit creates excess capacity, which 
reduces demand for new capital. The undervaluation of China’s currency makes 
production in China cheaper, and this encourages firms to both shift existing facilities and 
build new facilities in China. These shift effects have been documented by 
Bronfenbrenner and Luce.19 Undervaluation also reduces profitability of U.S. 
manufacturing and this reduces investment spending.20 The U.S. economy is of course a 
huge economy and these China effects are small in terms of total investment. However, 
China is likely exerting a chilling effect at the margin of manufacturing investment, and it 
is this margin where the recessionary impacts of investment decline have been felt and 
continue to be felt.21 
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Together, these employment and investment effects risk tipping the U.S. economy 
back into recession after a stultified expansion.22 If this happens it will have significant 
adverse consequences for the Chinese economy and the global economy since the U.S. 
economy has been the main engine of demand growth keeping the world economy 
flying.23 The contradiction in the Chinese development model is that China’s success 
threatens to undermine the U.S. economy, which has provided the demand fuelling that 
success. It is for this reason that China needs to replace its export-led growth strategy 
with a domestic demand-led growth strategy.  
Chinese economic statistics provide clear evidence of export-led growth. Table 1 
shows that nominal GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.2% between 2000 and 2003 
while exports grew at an average annual rate of 22.9% over the same period. Moreover, 
this difference increased in 2004 when nominal GDP increased 9.5% while exports 
surged 35.4%. The critical feature of export-led growth is reliance on exports as a source 
of final demand. Exports have clearly been growing faster than GDP, indicating that 
exports are becoming an increasingly important source of final demand. Moreover, this 
export growth is from a non-trivial base. GDP in 2004 was 13, 651 billion RMB, which 
translates to $1,645 billion using an exchange rate of 8.30 RMB per dollar. Exports in 
2004 were $593.4 billion, equal to 36 percent of GDP. Moreover, export demand comes 
from outside the economic system and therefore constitutes an injection of demand into 
the Chinese economy. This demand stimulates production and employment, which in turn 
generates additional demand from spending out of induced incomes. The contribution of 
exports, both directly and indirectly through induced demand, is therefore very large.  
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The underlying contradiction operates through the U.S. trade deficit, and fixing 
this deficit undoubtedly requires action by more countries than just China.24 That said, 
China is the single largest contributor to the deficit, accounting for approximately 30 
percent of the non-OPEC deficit. Moreover, its share is growing. The implication is that 
the U.S. trade deficit cannot be fixed without China’s cooperation.  
Other East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) are also large 
contributors to the trade deficit, and they will also need to revalue their currencies 
upward if the U.S. trade balance is to be put on a sustainable balance. However, there is a 
first mover problem. If they revalue their currencies upward but China does not, they will 
lose competitive advantage and could just transfer market share to Chinese exports with 
no benefit to the U.S. economy. To a lesser degree, if China revalues and they do not 
there could be a similar market share transfer effect. This points to the need for a 
coordinated East Asian currency adjustment, but China must play a lead role as it is the 
largest contributor to the deficit and the regional low cost producer. 
As of the moment, China’s adverse impact has not derailed the U.S. economy 
owing to continued debt financed spending by U.S. households.  China has therefore been 
able to continue to grow despite the weak U.S. recovery from recession. However, the 
U.S. trade deficit, the erosion of the U.S. manufacturing base, the increase in U.S. 
household indebtedness, and the weak jobs recovery are collectively undermining the 
structural strength of the U.S. economy. Though the economy looks strong, there is 
reason to believe that it is increasingly fragile – akin to a “Wiley Coyote” economy 
running on thinner and thinner air. The recovery has been financed by asset price 
appreciation, especially real estate, which has supported increased borrowing that has 
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funded consumer spending. Owing to the trade deficit, this spending has not generated a 
robust jobs recovery and the income to pay back these borrowings, yet indebtedness has 
increased. The danger is that the U.S. economy could stall, and the over-hang of 
consumer debt could then drive the economy into recession. With private sector balance 
sheets strained by debt taken on at current low interest rates and not open to refinancing, 
the U.S. would not have recourse to another recovery driven by consumer borrowing. 
Instead, debt burdens will deepen a slump. And if asset prices fall, the downturn could be 
amplified by household wealth erosion and the creation of negative homeowner equity 
that causes the housing market to seize up. 
This is a difficult scenario for Chinese policymakers to grasp since the damage to 
China is indirect, operating via recession in the United States. China’s trade surplus has 
been viewed as a sign of success and as critical to the Chinese development model. Now, 
Chinese policymakers need to change their thinking and recognize that the trade surplus 
has become a fatal flaw in the Chinese model. If the U.S. undergoes a consumption-
driven recession (as against an investment-driven recession), China risks catching 
economic pneumonia. Moreover, with much of the global economy also relying on the 
U.S. market, a U.S. recession will injure the global economy which will further hurt 
China by lowering global demand for Chinese exports.  
Finally, China’s export-led growth model is not just a problem for the United 
States. It is also a problem for other developing countries that compete with China in 
world markets. Moreover, this is likely to worsen with the ending of the multi-fiber 
agreement (MFA) governing textile trade as China stands to increase its share of global 
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textile exports at the expense of other developing countries, creating employment and 
balance of payments problems for these countries. 25  
China also poses an increasing problem for the European economy. First, Europe 
has a large textile industry that stands to be adversely impacted by the end of the MFA. 
Second, Europe is being adversely impacted by the appreciation of the euro against the 
renminbi. With the renminbi is pegged to the dollar, appreciation of the euro against the 
dollar implies an appreciation of the euro against the renminbi. Europe gained vis-à-vis 
China when the euro was weak: it loses when the euro is strong.  
The bottom line is that China has become a global manufacturing powerhouse on 
the back of its FDI export-led growth development model, and its manufacturing size is 
now exerting huge strains on the entire global economy. Thus far, China has been able to 
free-ride on global aggregate demand. The strategy worked when China was small: it 
cannot work now that China is so large. In effect, China’s free-riding has become an 
international public bad. China’s policymakers must recognize the necessity of adjusting 
their development model. However, it is difficult to persuade policymakers that 
adjustment is needed since the model works as long as the U.S. plays the role of buyer of 
last resort and accepts body blows to its manufacturing base.26 The piper will only have 
to be paid when this role is exhausted.27 
IV Beyond export-led growth: developing the demand side of the Chinese economy 
The solution to the contradictions posed by China’s emergence as a global export 
powerhouse is to build a robust internal Chinese market that supports domestic demand-
led growth. This requires developing structures, institutions, and economic relations that 
generate sustained stable internal demand growth. This is an enormous task and one that 
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is unrecognized in conventional development economics, which focuses exclusively on 
the supply-side of the economy. Developing the demand side of an economy is key to 
becoming a developed country status, yet it is a task that has received negligible 
attention.28 
Moving from the current model to the new model requires a short- and long-term 
strategy. The short-term strategy must address the fact that China is exerting destabilizing 
deflationary pressures on the global economy, that if not corrected risk triggering a global 
recession. The long-term strategy must wean China from export-led growth to domestic 
demand-led growth. This two-part adjustment strategy is shown in figure 3.  
Short term strategy: coordinated East Asian currency revaluation 
In the immediate short-term China must significantly revalue its exchange rate 
against the U.S. dollar by between 15 and 40 percent.29 This appreciation should be 
conducted as part of a broader coordinated move that has the exchange rates of other 
trade surplus East Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and 
Malaysia) also adjusting upward. Coordination is essential since all are contributing to 
the problem, and adjustment by just one country alone will cause it to lose 
competitiveness and suffer economic injury without fully correcting the problem. This is 
because its export production would tend to migrate to those countries that retained 
under-valued exchange rates so that the U.S. trade deficit would be only modestly 
improved. Coordination is therefore essential for a rapid effective correction of the U.S. 
trade deficit, which is the immediate threat to the U.S. and global economy. That said, 
China should lead this coordinated adjustment as it has by far the largest trade surplus 
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with the U.S., and that surplus is growing rapidly. Once China has signaled its acceptance 
of currency adjustment, others will do so voluntarily or can be easily persuaded to do so. 
Exchange rate revaluation will impose costs on China, which will experience a 
decline in demand for its exports. This decline will reduce demand for Chinese 
production and could slow growth. Why then should China make such an adjustment? 
The reason is that failure to do so risks a deep U.S. economic contraction that will 
seriously harm China, and it is better to take less costly pre-emptive action. Moreover, 
now is a propitious time to make such an adjustment, and it will also yield several 
benefits for China. With regard to timing, China has a large balance of payments surplus 
with the U.S. and the global economy. This means that it can accommodate a revaluation 
that appreciates the real exchange rate without being plunged into a balance of payments 
crisis. Second, revaluation can help China address the current threat of accelerating 
inflation that poses both economic and political threats.30 Third, revaluation will improve 
China’s terms of trade, making imports cheaper. This will benefit the average Chinese 
consumer. It will also lower the cost of imported inputs, partially offsetting the adverse 
competitive impact that revaluation has on Chinese export and import-competing 
industries. 
In addition to revaluing East Asia’s currencies, there is need for a new managed 
global exchange rate system analogous to Bretton Woods. Simply revaluing currencies 
will not bring about the changes in business behavior needed to put the U.S. economy 
back on a robust path of sustained growth. If business is to retain plants and make new 
investments in U.S. manufacturing, businessmen need to have confidence that the new 
exchange rates will hold for a significant period of time. If they feel that the revaluation 
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will reverse in the near future they will not alter their business plans. Investment and 
production will therefore not return the U.S., and the recovery will remain fragile. On this 
score, U.S. policymakers deserve criticism for failing to recognize this problem. In a 
knee-jerk reaction to earlier problems with fixed exchange rates in the 1990s, they are 
now pushing floating rates for all. This is inappropriate policy for a world integrated by 
trade and financial capital flow, and in which production and investment are highly 
mobile. A new system of managed exchange rates is what is called for.31 
Long term strategy: domestic demand-led growth 
With regard to long-term strategy, there is need for a dramatic recalibration of 
China’s development policy. Economic theory and policy has traditionally focused on 
expansion of the supply-side. This is the focus of the export-led growth paradigm which 
emphasizes becoming internationally competitive and relying on export markets – that 
are outside the control of developing country policymakers -- to provide demand and 
absorb increases in production. China has followed this paradigm for the last fifteen 
years, growing its export supply-side through FDI and relying on demand from export 
markets. Now, China must start to develop its own demand side.  
This is a difficult challenge. It is also one that economics has traditionally said 
little about because the main body of development economics ignores the demand-side.32 
The claim is that policymakers need only focus on the supply-side, and demand will 
automatically be forthcoming. Consequently, little attention has been devoted to the 
challenge of developing the demand side. Yet, successfully developing the demand side 
is the distinguishing hallmark between developed and developing countries. 
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Keynesian economics does emphasize demand considerations, but it operates in 
the context of mature market economies in which the process of demand generation is 
established. For Keynesians, shortages of demand can be remedied by government 
policies (lower interest rates and taxes) that stimulate private sector demand or by direct 
government spending. However, these policies ameliorate temporary failures in an 
established demand generation process. In developing countries the challenge is to build 
the demand generation process. Application of Keynesian policies to stimulate private 
sector demand in developing countries tends to contribute to excessive government 
deficits and promote an excessively large government sector. Increased government 
spending adds to demand but it increases deficits, and it also does little to generate 
“market” incomes that are the basis of a sustainable demand growth generation process. 
China’s challenge is to develop sustainable growing sources of non-inflationary 
domestic purchasing power. This means attending to both the investment allocation 
process and the income allocation process. The former is critical to ensure that resources 
are efficiently allocated, earn an adequate rate of return and add to needed productive 
capacity. The latter is critical to ensure that domestic demand is forthcoming to absorb 
increased output. Income must be placed in the hands of Chinese consumers if robust 
consumer markets are to develop. The challenge is to deliver this income in an efficient 
equitable manner that maintains economic incentives and is also consistent with 
aggregate production so as to avoid inflation. 
Reforming the investment allocation process 
Chinese investment spending relies significantly on a combination of FDI and 
public investment funded through the government owned banking system. This reliance 
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on public direction of the banking system has proven inefficient. With capital widely 
allocated on the basis of non-market criteria, investments are frequently unable to 
generate adequate market returns so that China’s banks are beset by massive non-
performing loans. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the failure to use market signals 
means that investment fails to remedy bottlenecks and can aggravate problems of surplus 
capacity. This is because politically favored sectors continue to receive investment funds 
even if they have surplus capacity, while out of favor sectors are denied funds even if 
they have bottlenecks. This misallocation means that inflation and deflation can coexist, 
with bottleneck sectors experiencing inflation while those with over-investment 
experience deflation. 
Reform of the banking system is critical to improving China’s capital allocation 
process, and it is also necessary to create efficient consumer credit and mortgage markets 
that can support demand generation in the household sector. Successful banking sector 
reform will raise productivity and output growth by improving the investment allocation 
process. At the same time, by strengthening consumption and housing demand, it will 
stimulate new investment spending to provide for those increased demand. 
Privatization of China’s banking system is key to reform, and some privatization 
is already underway. The Chinese model is one of partial privatization – selling off 
minority ownership stakes. The hope is to inject private sector management techniques 
into the banking system, thereby transforming it so that loans are made on the basis of 
borrower credit-worthiness. Selling off state-owned banks will also raise considerable 
sums for the Chinese state, while retaining a majority stake means that the Chinese 
government will also benefit from improvements in bank profitability. 
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However, there are risks with this strategy. First, foreign investors may be 
blocked from making needed reforms to lending and organizational practice because they 
are minority shareholders. Second, reform of the banking system will necessitate reform 
of government finances. This is because the banking system is currently used to dole out 
subsidies to failing SEOs and to direct capital to politically favored clients. If the banking 
system is made to operate according to commercial lending practices, such subsidies will 
no longer be available. Government can still use the banking system, but only as a 
payments system for making disbursements and collecting taxes. If China is unable to 
reform its public finances, this will likely sabotage banking sector reform. This points to 
a significant time consistency dangers in the current reform process. Having sold 
minority stakes in the banking system, Chinese policymakers may be unwilling to follow 
through and adopt real reform of banking practices.  
Lastly, as China modernizes its banking and financial system it must 
simultaneously develop a framework for conducting effective financial policy. If 
financial markets are to contribute fully to the demand generation process they must be 
stable, free of corruption, and deserving of investors’ confidence. They should also 
facilitate government counter-cyclical economic stabilization policy. China must 
therefore develop (i) deep bond markets that allow for open market monetary operations 
that control short-term interest rates, (ii) transparent and fair central bank discount 
window policy, (iii) transparent and effective accounting requirements and prudential 
regulation, and (iv) policy instruments of quantitative control – such as margin 
requirements, reserve requirements on capital inflows, and asset based reserved 
requirements – that can help mitigate pro-cyclical tendencies in financial markets.33  
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Income distribution: free trade unions and minimum wages 
Banking and financial market reform is a needed component of a domestic 
demand-led growth strategy. However, a greater challenge is developing an appropriate 
system of household income distribution that supports domestic consumer markets. 
Investment spending is an important source of demand, but the output generated by 
investments must find buyers or investment will cease. Likewise, public sector 
investment can be an important source of demand, but private sector output and income 
must grow overtime or else the government sector will come to dominate with negative 
consequences.  
With a population of 1.3 billion people China has an enormous potential domestic 
market. The challenge is to distribute income in a decentralized equitable fashion that 
leaves work and production incentives intact. The conventional view is that markets 
automatically take care of the problem by paying workers what they are worth and that 
all income is spent thereby generating the demand for output produced. In effect, the 
problem is assumed away. Indeed, to intervene and raise wages to increase demand 
would be to cause unemployment by making labor too expensive.  
This conventional logic contrasts with Keynesian economics, which identifies the 
economic problem as one of ensuring a level of aggregate demand consistent with full 
capacity utilization. Moreover, the level of aggregate demand (AD) is affected by the 
distribution of income, with worsened income distribution lowering aggregate demand 
because of the higher propensity to save among higher income households. From a 
Keynesian perspective, market forces do not automatically generate an appropriate level 
of AD. Demand can be too low because of lack of confidence among economic agents 
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that lowers investment and consumption spending. It can also be too low because the 
distribution of income is skewed excessively toward upper income groups.34  
The importance of income distribution for AD and full employment means that 
labor markets are of critical significance. Labor markets determine wages, and wages 
impact income distribution and AD. From a Keynesian perspective, the problem is that 
bargaining power can be highly skewed leading to wages that are too low. This problem 
is particularly acute in developing countries. Trade unions are a vital economic 
mechanism for rectifying imbalances of bargaining power and they can therefore help 
achieve an appropriate distribution of income. Palley presents evidence to this effect.35 
Cross-country data for a panel of seventy-nine countries from the second half of the 
1980s and the first half of the 1990s shows that improved freedom of association in labor 
markets is associated with improved income distribution and higher wages.  
Rather than being a market distortion as described in neo-classical economics, 
trade unions may correct market failure associated with imbalanced bargaining power. 
Viewed in this light, trade unions are the market friendly approach to correcting labor 
market failure because unions set wages in a decentralized fashion. Though wages are set 
by collective bargaining, wages can differ across firms with unions in more efficient 
firms bargaining higher wages than those at less efficient firms. This contrasts with a 
government edict approach to wage setting.  
This suggests that a key priority for China should be to develop a system of 
democratic trade unions that freely bargain wages. Just as China is reforming its 
corporate governance and financial system, so too it must embrace labor market reform 
centered on democratic trade unions because this is the market centered way of 
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establishing an income distribution that can support a consumer society. Outside of 
Western Europe, only the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand 
have successfully made the transformation to mature developed market economies. In all 
cases this transformation coincided with the development of effective domestic trade 
unions.  
The encouragement of free trade unions should also be supported by effectively 
enforced minimum wage legislation. Just as trade unions have helped developed 
countries make the move to demand-led growth, so too have minimum wages. China is a 
continental economy in which regions differ dramatically by level of development. This 
suggests the need for a refined system of minimum wages in which minimum wages are 
set on a regional basis and take account of regional differences in living costs. Overtime, 
as development spreads and backward regions catch up, these settings can be adjusted 
with the ultimate goal being a uniform national minimum wage.  
Lastly, these wage-targeted labor market reforms should be paired with the 
development of a social safety net that provides insurance to households. This will 
increase households’ sense of confidence and security, thereby diminishing the need for 
precautionary saving and enabling households to spend more on consumption. 
Can China afford higher wage costs? 
Finally, there is the issue of costs. As long as China follows an export-led growth 
strategy, production costs will be paramount. The dynamic of export-led growth, with its 
focus on international markets, forces countries to try and ever lower costs to gain 
international competitive advantage. This makes for systemic downward pressure on 
wages, and these pressures are needed to keep export-led growth viable. 
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A domestic demand-led growth paradigm removes this pressure. Now, higher 
wages become a source of demand and therefore strengthen the viability of employment. 
Capital must still earn an adequate return to pay for itself and entice new investment, but 
moderately higher wages now strengthen the system rather than undercutting it. 
V Summation 
 China’s current development model faces an external constraint that risks causing 
a hard landing in China and the global economy. China has become a manufacturer of 
global scale, rendering its export-led growth strategy unsustainable. China relies on the 
U.S. market, but the scale of its exports is undermining U.S. manufacturing and risks 
tipping the U.S. economy back into recession, which would then trigger a Chinese and 
global recession. This is the external constraint. 
 China should shift from export-led growth to domestic demand-led growth. This 
requires a focus on growing the demand side of the economy, not just the supply-side. In 
the immediate short-term there is need for a significant currency revaluation to avoid 
stalling the U.S. economic expansion. Longer term, China must move to raise wages and 
improve income distribution. In an export-led growth system, higher wages undermine 
growth. In a domestic demand-led growth system, they support it. The challenge is to 
raise wages in an efficient decentralized manner, which calls for developing independent 
democratic trade. However, independent unions are unacceptable to the current Chinese 
political leadership. Moving China on to a path of domestic demand-led growth therefore 
requires solving this political roadblock.   
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 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Nominal GDP (RMB billions)  8,206 8,947 9,731 10,479 11,669
Change nominal GDP (%) 4.7 9.0 8.8 7.7 11.4 
Real GDP growth (%) 7.1 8.0 7.5 8.0 9.1 
FDI – utilized ($ billions) 40.3 40.7 46.9 52.7 53.5 
China’s exports ($ billions) – Chinese data 194.9 249.2 266.2 325.6 438.4 
% change in China’s exports  6.1  27.8 6.8 22.3 34.6 
China’s trade surplus with the U.S.:      
- Chinese data ($ billions) 23.5 30.9 29.4 44.1 60.3 
- U.S. data ($ billions) 68.9 84.2 84.1 104.2 124.9 
China’s global trade surplus:       
- Chinese data ($ billions) 37.7 35.4 35.3 45.1  
- 43 partner data ($ billions) 140.4 171.6 170.3 189.9  
FX Reserves ($ billions) 154.7 165.6 212.2 286.4 403.3 
% Money supply (M2) growth  14.7 12.3 14.4 16.8 19.6 
 
Table 1. Key statistics on the Chinese economy. Trade surplus data are provided by the 
Fair Currency Alliance, Washington, D.C., Brief No. 1, June 10, 2004. All other data are 
from the U.S.-China Business Council, www.uschina.org/statistics/economy.html.  
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Table 2. Regional composition of the U.S. goods trade deficit. Source: United States 
Department of Commerce and author’s calculations. 
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